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The repeated use of price and wage controls is likely to destabi-
lize inflation in the medium run. The similar cyclical pattern of
inflation observed in the aftermath of the failures of the Austral
plan in Argentina and the Cruzado plan in Brazil is mostly  linked
to anticipations about the introduction of price controls.  The
heterodox approach is risky if not accompanied by an adequate
adjustment in the budget deficit.
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The  Inflation-Stabilization  Cycles  in  Argentinia  and  Brazil
Miguel  A. Kiguel  and  Nissan  Liviatan
I. Introduction
The  Austral  plan in  Argentina  and  the  Cruzado  plan in  Brazil  were  major
stabilization  attempts  with lasting  effects  on the  inflation  process  in  both
countries. They  were  different  from  previous  scabilization  efforts  at least
A two  respects:  first,  they  were the  first  programs  that  succeeded,  albeit
temporarily,  to reduce  inflation  drastically  in  the  short  run,  and second,
ley  had  a lasting  effect  in the  sense  that  they  changed  the  pattern  of
$flation  in  both  countries.
Inflationary  developments  in  the  two  countries  have  become  surprisingly
similar  after  the failure  of the  heterodox  shocks  (see  figure  1).  This
stands  in  contrast  with the  differences  in  the  characteristics  of the
.flation  process  in  previous  years  in the  two  countries. Before  these
3rograms  inflation  was higher,  more  unstable,  and  had a  clearer  fiscal  nature
in  Argentina  than  in  Brazil. These  differences  have  all  but  disappeared  in
the  aftermath  of the  Austral  and  Cruzado  programs  as  both  countries  underwent
similar  inflation-stabilization  cycles.
There  is a systematic  pattern  in the  cycles. Inflation  falls
dramatically  in  response  to  a stabilization  program  based  on price-wage
controls,  and  remains  low  for  a number  of months. Inflation  then  starts  to
accelerate  as  controls  are  being  removed,  and  eventually  becomes  explosive,
many times  reaching  hyperinflationary  levels. This  explosion  is stopped1-a
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arough  a new round of controls,  which sets the stage for the new cycle.  The
{stem  has become more unstabie over time, inflation reaches new record  high
'els  in each successive cycle  while the period of low inflation following
ie  imposition of controls has become shorter  over time.
The purpose of this paper is to understand the reasons that led to the
.arge  instability in inflation in both countries during this period, and to
Nxplain  why neither country succeeded in sustaining  a high, but stable rate
inflation.  This instability  was not accompanied by a noticeable increase
the average rate of inflation.  In Argentina inflation  was in fact lower
average during the first three years after the Austral plan than in the
hree years oefore  while in Brazil the incrt.se in the average rate of
inflation after the Cruzado plan was not '-amatic.
In our view, the type of instability that emerged following the railure
the heterodox shocks  was a consequence of the large reliance on income
licies for stopping inflation in the Austral and Cruzado plans and in the
1low-up programs.  It  was the repeated use of controls accompanied by
pectations and anticipations about government actions by firms and workers
at introduced the observed instability  during this period.
The current cycles are difficult to explain using the fiscal approach.
course, it could be argued that the fiscal imbalance  made low inflation  an
reachable target, and that lack of fiscal  discipline was the most important
ctor for the eventual collapse of the Austral and Cruzado plans.  But this
es not mean that inflationary developments during this period can be easily
nked to the government budget.  The fiscal approach does not help us to
understand why inflation was so unstable during the cycle regime.  In
addition, it fails to explain why we did not observe a high but stable3
inflation  level  during  the  ririod,  or  why  were  the  hyperinflation  explosions
not  accompanied  by  massive  budget  deficits  or extremely  high seigniorage
levels  as  was the  case  in  most  of the  European  hyperinflations.
Likewise,  it is  difficult  to link  the  instability  of inflation  to the
foreign  debt  overhang  in both  countries. The  debt  overhang  became  apparent
in 1982  and  was perhaps  a  major  reason  for  the  increase  in  inflation  prior  to
the  cycle  period. But  the  external  debt  situation  did  not  deteriorate  in any
significant  way during  the  period  of the  cyclesl. Lack  of external  financing
might  explain  why inflation  was  high,  but  not  why it  was so  volatile.
The  paper  will be organized  as follows. In section  II  we present  a
brief  summary  of the  process  of inflation  in  both  countries  prior  to the
heterodox  shocks,  and  the  basic  features  of the  new regime  that  emerged  after
their  failure. Iin  section  III  we examine  the  l'mitations  of the  fiscal  and
"inertial  inflation  view*  to  explain  thp  increasing  inscabi:ity  of inflation
during  this  period. We provide  an alternative  explanation  for  these  cycles
which  places  more emphasis  on expectations  and the  repetitive  use  of controls
as an anti-inflation  device. We argue  in  this  section  that  both  countries
are  experiencing  a  new type  of inertia,  inertia  in  processes. A more in
depth  analysis  of the  cycles  is  presented  in section  IV,  including  a
discussion  of the  reasons  that  led  to  the  freeze,  those  that  forced  the
authorities  to flexibilize  controls,  and  the  eventual  explosion  of inflation.
We conclude  in section  V  with some  thoughts  about  the  sustainability  of the
regime,  and  the  implications  of these  developments  for  the  design  of
stabilization  plans  in'  both  countries.
1  In fact  Argentina  and  Brazil  have recently  suspended  service  on
their  external  debt.4
1I.  Inflation  Before  and After  the  Heterodox  Shocks
Inflation  Before
The inflation  process  in these  two  high  chronic  inflation  countries  was
ery  differenit  prior  to  the  heterodox  shocks  (HSs)  of the  eighties. As can
e noticed  from  figures  2.a  and  2.b,  which  show  the  evolution  of annual
nflation  and  seigniorage 2 for  the  two  countries  since  the  early  1970s,
nflation  was  more  unstable  in  Argentina  than  in  Brazil  during  this  period,
while  its  fiscal  nature  was  more  apparent  in the  former  than  in the  latter.
Argentina
Changes  in inflation  in  Argentina  were closely  related  to changes  in
the  budgat  deficit  and seigniorage  in  the  same  direction. As can  be noticed
from  figure  2.a,  the  1973-75  and  1983-85  explosions  in inflation  occurred  in
periods  of  extremely  high  budget  deficits  in  which  seignic  %ge  had reached
unsustainaLle  levels  (exceeding  7  percent  of GDP). Although  the  fiscal  view
explains  a significant  part  of the  behavior  of inflation,  non-fiscal  factors
also  had a bearing  on the  inflation  process. The  long  tradition  of failed
stabilization  attempts,  for  example,  implied  that  each  new  anti-inflation
program  had to confront  severe  credibility  problems  that  added  to the
downward  rigidities  of the  inflation  process. In  practice  this  meant  tha.
2  Seigniorage  is  measured  as the  change  in central  bank  non-interest
bearing  liabilities  (typically  the  monetary  base)  as a percentage  of  GDP.
Given  the  type  of remuneration  on  bank reserves  in  Argentina,  Ml is the
basis  of seignorage  and inflation  tax. The  level  of seigniorage  is an
indicator  of the  amount  of resources  the  government  extracts  from  the
rivate  sector  thanks  to its  monopoly  in  printing  money. The  figures  of
udget  deficit  and  inflation,  available  from  the  authors  upon  request,
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achieving  rapid reductions in inflation.  The slow pace of the reduction in
inflation during the  Martinez de Hoz period can be explained by lack of
credibility about the ability of the government to enlarge and sustain the
fiscal ad,ustment, but perhaps as important  was the lack of credibility on
the maintenance of the nominal anchors.  Doubts about whether the government
would st3ck or not to the preannounced exchange rate rule (the tablita)  when
faced  with an overvalued currency certainly added to the downward rigidity of
inflation that eventually led to the failure of the attempt.  Indeed, there
is an important difference between credibility on the commitment to the
fiscal adjustment and credibility on the adherence to the nominal anchor. 3
Brazil
The inflation process is more difficult to explain in Brazil since
jumps to higher inflation plateaux over the years  were not associated with
conspicuous increases in seigniorage,  which by and large has remained fairly
stable over the years (ranging  between 1.5 and 3.5 percent of GDP).  InsteaJ,
they resulted from the adoption of a set of policies that induced an
asymmetric behavior of inflation, inflatior  moved up in response to  a'verse
(external)  shocks, but did not come down ds  a result of favorable
developments.  The use of accommodating mor.etary  and exchange rate policies
and the widespread use of indexation in the labor and financial markets were
instrumental factors for inflation to stabilize at higher plateaux, but  as
important was the perception that the government preferred to validate
inflation rather than fight against it and sacrifice growth.  In practice
3  In the last section of this  paper we present a more thorough
discussion of this issue.6
this  view  can  explain  why inflation  roughly  doubled  and  stabilized  at new
higher  plateaux  after  the large  devaluations  in response  to the  two  oil
crises  (in  1974  and 1979),  and  again  in  the  1980s  in response  to the  debt
crisis  (in  1983)  rather  than  generating  a temporary  inflationary  outburst  as
in  other  countries.
It is  useful  in  this  respect  to analyze  the  macroeconomic  developments
after  the  1982-83  debt  crisis. The  adjustment  to the  new  situation  was  based
on a  policy  of a sharp  fiscal  contraction,  a stepping  up  of the  rate  of
devaluation,  and  a reduction  in the  real  wage.  In a  non-indexed  economy  this
last  objective  can  be achieved  by a one  time  devaluation. However,  with full
backward  wage indexation  and  downward  rigidity  in  the  real  base  wage,  the
real  wage can  be brought  down  only  by an increase  in  the inflation  plateau.
We thus  observed  the somewhat  paradoxical  situation  of joint  reduction  in the
fiscal  deficit  and  an increase  in the  inflation  plateau  in  1983-85  (these
developments  are  described  more fully  in  Kiguel  and  Liviatan  (1988)).
ii.  The  change  in  Regime  after  the  HSs
The failure  of the  HSs  marked  the  beginning  of a new  era  in the
inflation  processes  in  the  two  countries. This  can  be readily  noticed  from
figures  l.a  and  l.b  whi,.h  show  monthly  inflation  rates  and  the  overall  trend
in inflation  from  1982  onwards. The  striking  element  in these  figures  is  the
increased  inflation  instability  and  the  ,milar pattern  of inflation
stabilization  cycles  that  emerged  after  the  failure  of the  Austral  and
Cruzado  plans. 4 Two  cour.tries  where  the  causes  and  characteristics  of
4  The  problems  with the  design  of the  Austral  and  Cruzado  plans  and
the reason  for  their  failure  are  discussed  in  Bruno  et al. (1988),  Heymann
(1987),  and  (1990),  Kiguel  (1989),  Machinea  (1989),  and  Cardoso  and
Dornbusch  (1987)  among  others.7
inflation  were  different  are  now  undergoing  a  similar  inflation  pattern.
The  comon element  in the  Austral  and  Cruzado  plans  was the  use  of
income  policies  as a stabilization  instrument.  In  both  countries,  the
motivation  for  using  controls  was the  perception  that  non-fundamental  forces
(expectations,  indexation,  etc.)  were important  in  explaining  the  short  run
dynamics  of inflation. The  Austral  plan  was  better  designed,  paid  more
attention  to the  fiscal  imbalance  and  followed  more prudent  monetary  and  wage
policies  at the  outset,  but  that  was  not enough  to prevent  the  ensuing
similar  outcome. The  use  of controls  in  both  countries  became  more  apparent
in the  follow-up  programs. The  main features  of the  various  stabilization
attempts  in  the  two  countries  are  summarized  in table  1i.  It  can  be noticed
from  there  that  there  was  as systematic  use  of controls,  while little
attention  was devoted  to the  correction  in the  fundamentals.
,he  pattern  of the  cycles  has  been similar  i,&  both  countries.
Typically,  we observe  very  drastic  accelerations  of inflation,  in  some
instances  possibly  positioning  the  economy  on a unstable  hyperinflationary
path,  which  were stopped  abruptly,  in  all  cases,  through  a  program  based  on
price  and  wage controls. Price  stability  usually  lasted  for  a short  span,
and  was followed  by a rekindling  of inflation  which  very  quickly  exploded
into  a  new inflationary  outburst,  generally  stronger  than  the  previous  one.
It  would  be inaccurate  to say  that  there  was no attempt  to  use  nominal
anchors  in the  follow-up  programs. Tighter  monetary  policy  was  used in
Argentina  in the  spring  plans  of 1986  and  1988.  In  B;azil,  tight  money  was
one  of the  main policy  means  in  the  summer  plan  of 1989. However,  these
policies  were not  pursued  persistently  because  of their  recessionary  effects
S  See  also  Heymann  (1990)  and  Cardoso  (1990).7-a
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and b.'ecause  they were not supported by appropriate adjustmer-,ts  on the fiscal
sidLe.
't is easy to point out the inconsistency between price freezes and
continuing fiscal  deficits for the failure of the various stabilization
attempts.  It is  more difficult to explain why a relatively high, but stah%le.
level of inflation  could not be maintained in the post Austral-Cruzado
period.  For example, following the flexibilization of the exchange rate in
Argentina in  April 1986 and prices in May the objective for inflation was not
a freeze but rather a stable crawl.  This was also the case in the spring
plan of August 1988.  Similarly, Brazil's policy in 1988 was to stabilize
inflation even at extremely high rates.  Thus towards the end of 1988 a
social pact was invoked in order to stabilize inflation at 26.5Z per
month (').  In spite of the readiness to accommodate a high, but stable
inflationary path the realities of the situation did not make this possible.
There was an important difference in the manner in which the two
ountries entered the unstable regime.  In the case of Argentina, the
Austral I  was already a reaction to a possible hyperinflationary trajectory
which may have had its origins in the extremely high levels of seigniorage in
982-84.  On the  whole, the repeated use of controls in the post-Austral
eriod aggravated an existing instabilitv problem.  By contrast, the
nflationary process in Brazil prior to the Cruzado plan (since 1984) was
uite stable (excluding the few  months just preceding the plan where the
reeze  was possibly anticipated).  Therefore in the case of Btazil the
onnection between over reliance on income policies and inflationary
instability comes out more clearly.
ii. Process Inertia9
The recurrent  pattern  of the  cycles  indicates  that  the  two  countries
experienced  a new  type  of inertia:  inertia  in the  inflation  process.
Traditionally,  the  concept  of inflation  inertia  was used  to denote  a
situation  in  which  past  inflation  rates  set  the  norm  for  current  inflation,
past  developments  tend  to repeat  themselves.  This  notion  is  not  useful  to
explain  a process  in  which  inflation  continuously  accelerates.  Nevertheless,
a reinterpretation  of this  concept  can  still  be appropriate. The  current
cycles  have  established  a pattern,  stabilization  is  short  lived,  followed  by
an acceleration  in inflation  that  comes  to  an abrupt  end  through  an income
policies  based  stabilization  program. This 'inertia'  in the  process  observed
during  the  cycles  regime  is  a  new feature,  one  that  emerged  due  to the
failure  of the  HSs.
This  systematic  pattern  is reflected  in  the  use  of  anchors  during  this
regime  and  expectations.  They  fluctuated  from  multiple  and  very  strong
a.achors  during  the  period  of the  freeze,  to lax  and  almost  non-existing  ones
after  flexibilization.  Indeed,  the  exchange  rate,  wages,  and  public  and
private  sector  prices  all served  as  nominal  anchors  during  the  period  of the
freeze. However,  the  economies  were left  without  any  effective  nominal
anchor  once  flexibilization  started. Prices  and  wages  were freely  determined
while  the  exchange  rate  and  prices  of  public  sector  enterprises  were in
practice  indexed  to  past inflation.  On the  whole,  the  freeze,  even  if it
lasted  for  a relatively  short  period,  proved  to  be the  nominal  anchor  during
this regime  providing  some  stability  to the  system. The  usefulness  of this
anchor  decreased  over  time  as the  duration  of controls  and  periods  of low
inflation  became  shorter,  in  effect  resulting  in  a  protracted  increase  in
inflation.10
As the  new  regime  became  better  understood  by private  agents,  it  was
incorporated  in the  way in  which  they  form  their  expectations.  This  added  to
the  instability  observed  in  the  period. Any  new shock  that  resulted  in  an
increase  in inflation  very  rapidly  gave  rise  to  a new  acceleration  in
inflation  that  eventually  was expected  to end  through  a new  round  of
controls.
III. Alternative  Explanations  for  the  Inflation-Stabilization  Cycles
The  pattern  of inflation  in this  period  raises  a number  of interesting
questions. Why  did  both  countries  experience  a similar  cyclical  inflation
pattern  despite  a  history  of very  differ2nt  inflationary  policies? Why could
not inflation  in  both  countries  stabilize  at a constant  (possibly  high)
level,  compatible  with the  fundamentals? Were  the  explosive  parts  of the
cycles  the  result  of repressed  inflation  during  the  period  of controls? Were
these  economies  in  an overall  hyperinflationary  path  or  was it  once again
chronic  high inflation?  Were these  causes  the  same  in  both countries? The
last  question  is  especially  interesting  because  the  underlying  causes  for  the
chronic  inflation  in the  two  countries  were,  as  we already  discussed,  very
different.
Traditional  approaches  can  at best  provide  a  partial  answer  to these
questions. Neither  the  fiscal  approach,  which  was instrumental  to  understand
inflationary  developments  in  Argentina  prior  to  the  Austral  plan,  nor  the
winertiaR/indexation  view usually  employed  to  understand  Brazilian  inflation
provide  a satisfactory  and  comprehensive  explanation  of the  inflationary
processes  after  the  HSs.11
i. The Fiscal View
There are basically two alternative ways to rationalize the drastic and
rapid acceleration in each cycle using the fiscal view.  First, it could be
argued that the underlying fiscal situation  was characterized by massive
budget deficits that would eventually result in a full blown, 'traditional,
hyperinflation.  The role of controls  was to repress this outcome, but they
could only be applied temporarily given the feeble fiscal balance.  The
removal of controls paved the  way for the inevitable explosion of inflation.
An alternative way to use the fiscal approach is to argue that there was a
stable level of inflation  consistent with the needs to finance the deficit
through  money creation.  Controls repressed inflation temporarily below this
'fiscal'  equilibrium, but then inflation overshot during the flexibilization
period to compensate for the lost revenues during the periods of controls.
This framework implicitly assumes that the acceleration in inflation was a
temporary phenomenon which would be reversed at a later stage as inflation
stabilizes at a level consistent  with the needs to finance the deficit
through money creation.  Neither of these possibilities, however, appears to
"fit' the stylized facts of the period.
We consider first the plausibility of the  hyperinflation view.  In our
opinion, for most of the period the level of seigniorage  did not warrant a
hyperinflation.  Two features  have characterized traditional hyperinflations;
extremely large budget deficits and spigniorage levels, and a relencless
acceleration of the rate of inflation.  In Brazil, seigniorage never exceeded
3.5 percent of GDP while the operational deficit was on average lower than in
the pre-Cruzado period.  Likewise, in Argentina, the deficit was much lower
than during the pre-Austral period while seigniorage remained below pre-12
Austral plan levels in 1986 and 1987; although there was an increase in
seigniorage in 1988, this took place toward the end of the year and by then
two large accelerations in inflation  had already taken place.  Neither case
resembled the fiscal situation of Bolivia  where the hyperinflation developed
due to deficits in excess of 15 percent of GDP and seigniorage levels
continuously exceeding 12 percent of GDP.
This view is consistent with the overall trend in inflation in the two
countries.  While there  was a continuous increase in average inflation in the
post HS period following the initial fall inflation, this was not accompanied
by a clear increase in average seigniorage.  This is confirmed by the
evidence presented in figures 3.a and 3.b  which show monthly real revenues
from money creation (RMC) 6. They indicate that in Brazil, and to a lesser
extent in Argentina, there  was no clear upward trend in RMC over the period,
except for the recent hyperinflation in Argentina.  Further evidence on this
respect can be obtained from table 2 which shows that the coefficient of the
inflation trend (row 1) in Argentini and Brazil in the post HS period was
only about one third of that of Bolivia.  It is only if we include the 1989
acceleration in Argentina that we approach the Bolivian coefficient.
The autoregression coefficients in the same tables (rows 2 and 3)  may
shed additional light on the nature of the inflationary instability.  We note
that in Bolivia, which represents a classical hyperinflation, the
coefficients indicate a very weak inertia, or a low persistence of
6 RMC is defined here as the three month moving average of AH/CPI,
where H denotes the non-interest bearing liabilities of the central bank.
For Argentina the relevant  monetary aggregate is  Ml while for Brazil it is
the monetary base.  This concept is basically similar to seigniorage just
discussed, except that the latter is defined as a percent of GDP.12-a
Table  2
Auto-Reressive  of Inflation  in  Apeetina, Bre4il,  and  Eolivis
Independent  Variableo
Period  Equation  Conotont  .PINF(t-1)  Trend  Adjustod  O.W.
R-Sqwars
1.  Argentina:  ftfore  and  After  the  Au-r.el
1961.01-1995.06  (1)  -0.7404  0.3770  0.7606  1.21
(-.'9)  (12.56)  (157.66)
(2)  -0.3363  0.3963  0.2292  0.7864  1.31
(-.29)  (3.04)  (4.09)  (96.16)
(3)  2.3429  0.5683  0.7193  2.10
(2.10)  (11.59)  (134.20)
19U4.06  1916.06  (1)  -44.0694  0.6103  0.6453  0.83
(-4.66)  (5.07)  (32.13)
(2)  -21.3654  0.6291  0.2843  0.6769  1.12
(-1.97)  (3.34)  (2.13)  (29.23)
(3)  1.6260  0.9231  0.6309  2.04
(1.06)  (6.74)  (46.46)
196.06-1919.09  (1)  -141.554  1.6797  0.2566  0.97
(-3.24)  (3.76)  (14.06)
(2)  -70.3082  0.5137  0.6380  0.4362  1.75
(-1.64)  (3.61)  (1.86)  (15.82)
(3)  6.4197  0.6246  0.3732  1.70
(1.52)  (4.66)  (23.63)
2.  BRAZIL: Before  and After  the  Cruzado
1.90.02-1965.12  (1)  4.5829  0.0832  0.438  1.24
(9.84)  (7,51)  (FS.33)
(2)  2.8617  0.3755  0.0532  0.4968  2.04
(4.14)  (3.29)  (3.79)  (35.83)
(3)  2.7086  0.6588  0.4019  2.27
(3.59j  (6.93)  (48.05)
1967.01  1939.12  (1)  9.7948  0.6622  0.3379  0.55
'3.03)  (4.34)  (18.86)
(2)  2.0479  0.7681  0.2187  0.8836  1.31
(.77)  (5.52)  (1.66)  (35.51)
(3)  3.5029  0.8928  0.6466  1.35
(1-38)  (8.06;,  (5S.02)
3.  SOLIVIA:  Hyper-Inmlation
1993.01-1986.06  (1)  -91.7774  2.1944  0.3121  1.84
(-2.71)  (3.88)  (1S.G5.)
(2)  -75.3915  0.0791  2.0252  0.2328  1.96
(-2.22)  (.43)  (2.91)  (7.42)
(3)  21.2929  1.3842  0.1171  2.01
(2.67)  (2.26)  (5.11)
Figures  in  parentheses  wnder  tho  ootimated  coOff;cients  are  t-statistics.
Figures  in  parentheseo  under  the  adjusted  R-oquare  are  F-statistics.
Notes:  Equation  I  CPINF(t)  s C *  TREND
Equation  2  CPINF(t)  a  C . CPINF(t-1)  . TREND
Equation  3  CPINF(t)  * C . CPSNF(t-1)
Notations  CPZNP  a  CPT Inflation
CPINFT  a  Trend  of CPI  Inflation  (CPI(t)/CPI(t-12))  - I13
inflationary  shocks  (which  include  also  stabilization  attempts). By
contrast,  persistence  remained  at high  levels  in  Argentina  and  Brazil  in the
post  HS period,  suggesting  a different  process  -presumably  not a fiscal
hyperinflation.
There  are  also  difficulties  in  using  the  alternative  fiscal  view,  i.e.
that  the  underlying  fiscal  imbalance  required  a high  but  stable  level  of
inflation  towards  which  the  cycles  tend  to converge. A pattern  of inflation
consistent  with this  approach  would  start  with  an acceleration  coinciding
with the  removal  of controls,  after  which  inflation  would  tend  to stabilize
at a  level  consistent  with the  fundamentals.  An initial  overshooting  of
inflation  during  the  flexibilization  stage  is  consistent  with the  basic
arguments  of the  approach,  but-this  increase  should  be reversed  at a later
stage  as inflation  stabilizes  so that  the  inflation  tax  revenue  stays  in  line
with the  need to finance  the  deficit  through  money  creation.
This  view that  inflation  was converging  to a stable  level  is  not
supported  by the  available  evidence. Tcble  3 shows  the  results  of the
aut7iregressive  equations  for  the  individual  cycles. In  both  countries  the
large  size  of the  coefficient  of the  trend  in  equation  (1)  shows  that
inflation  was  not  converging  to a stable  level. They  indicate  that  within
each  cycle  the  dynamics  of inflation  were  akin  to inflation  explosions
characteristic  of hyperinflations,  as  opposed  to the "inertia'  observed  in
these  two  countries  prior  to the  HSs.  In fact,  the  coefficients  of cpinf(-l)
and  the  trend  in  equation  (2)  for  the  second  and  third  cycle  in  Argentina
bear  striking  resemblance  to those  of the  Bolivian  hyperinfiation.  The  only
non-explosive  cycle  corresponds  to the  period  between  the  Bresser  and  Summer
plans  in  Brazil,  when as  a result  of a  gradual  stabilization  attempt  between13-a
Table 3
Individual  Inflation  Cycles  in  Argentina  and Brazil
Independent  Variables
---------------------------- _-----




1986.09-1986.08  (1)  0.6658  0.5091  0.7216  1.38
(.36)  (5.43)  (29.50)
(2)  0.1348  0.3841  0.3841  0.7249  1.78
(.16)  (1.06)  (2.S5)  (16.49)
1987.04-1987.10  (1)  0.1893  2.4746  0.8844  3.03
(.12)  (8.86)  (48.91)
(2)  0.7203  -0.1678  2.69e8  0.8636  2.94
(.3484)  (-.49)  (4.47)  (19.99)
1987.12-1988.08  (1)  2.2123  2.7098  0.9238  1.80
(1.44)  (9.90)  (97.96)
(2)  2.7599  -0.1612  3.0463  0.9160  1.63
(1.48)  (-.59)  (4.77)  (44.80)
1988.11-1989.07  (1)  -51.7816  20.8247  0.7087  0.66
(-2.0)  (4.52)  (20.48)
(2)  -12.5410  1.4550  3.8108  0.9735  3.11
(-1.38)  (8.42)  (1.56)  (147.91)
2.  Brazil
1986.04-1987.05  (1)  -7.1441  1.9385  0.8103  0.42
(-3.25)  (7.52)  (S6.51)
(2)  -0.5881  1.099d  0.2784  0.96  1.38
(-.42)  (6.77)  (1.02)  (156.85)
1986.10-1987.05  (1)  -3.3267  3.5226  0.9534  1.69
(-2.25)  (12.01)  (144.18)
(2)  -2.3238  0.2737  2.7393  0.947  1.S9
(-.94)  (.52)  (1.79)  (63.52)
1987.08-1989.01  (1)  6.6856  1.4063  0.9179  0.91
(6.07)  (13.83)  (191.15)
(2)  4.705  0.3066  1.017  0.9183  1.16
(2.14)  (1.04)  (2.62)  (96.59)
1989.03-1989.12  (1)  0.795  6.2562  0.8805  0.99
(.20)  (8.20)  (67.30)
(2)  0.7958  0.331  3.7191  0.8827  1.03
(.20)  (1.07)  (2.37)  (34.86)
Notes:  Equation  (1):  CPINF(t)  =  C  +  TREND
Equation  (2):  CPINF(t)  a  C  *  CPINF(t-1)  *  TREND
Figures  in  the parentheses  under the estimated coefficients  are t-statistics.
Figures  in  the parenthoses  under  tho  adjusted  R-square  are F-statistics.
Notatiors:  CPINF  r  CPI Inflation14
March  and  August  1988.  there  was a pause  in the  increase  in inflation.
It  could  be argued  that  while  the  fiscal  view  can  not  explain  the
pattern  of inflation  during  the  cycles,  it  can  still  be useful  to understand
the  overall  increasing  trend  in inflation  in the  post-HS  period. The  data
presented  in table  4 suggests  that  while  this  argument  could  still  be  made
for  Argentina,  where  the  reduction  in  average  inflation  was accompanied  by  a
reduction  in average  fiscal  deficits,  the  increase  in average  inflation  in
Brazil  during  these  years  has  been  accompanied  by relatively  stable  (and
according  to some  estimates  falling)  budget  deficits  and  seigniorage  levels.
ii.  The Inertia-Indexation  Approach
The  recent  events  are  also  difficult  to  explain  using  the  inertia-
backward  indexation  view,  formalized  by Bacha  and  Lopez  (1983)  and  Modiano
(1988)  among  others. Broadly  speaking,  this  approach  argues  that  due to  wage
indexation  there  is significant  short  term  inertia  (or  persistence)  in
inflation,  and  that  increases  ir inflation  are  usually  associated  with
attempts  to  erode  the  average  re.L  wage.  Two  features  observed  during  the
cycles  cast  doubts  on the  validity  of this  approach. First,  inflation  was
accelerating  during  the  upward  part  of the  cycle  rather  than  staying  stable
at past  inflation  levels. Second,  in  contrast  to the  predictions  of this
approach,  in some  of the  cycles,  especially  in  Brazil,  the  accelerations  in
inflation  coincided  with increases  in real  wages.
The  relatively  ineffectiveness  of this  approach  to  explain  inflation
does  not  mean that  inertial  inflation  disappeared  in the  post-HS  period. As
the  regressions  discussed  earlier  indicated,  there  continued  to  be
persistence  in the  inflation  process.  The  degree  of  price  synchronization
bserved  in Bclivia,  is  not  apparent  in  either  economy.1S
iii.  An Alternative  View:  Anticipations  of Recurrent  Controls
In our  view the  main  explanation  for  the  regime  of explosive
inflationary  cycles  that  emerged  in  both  countries  after  the  failure  of the
Austral  and  Cruzado  plans  lies  in the  nature  of the  policies  adopted  to fight
inflation  during  this  period. In  particular,  it  was the  repeated  use  of
price  controls  in stabilization  programs,  which  were  not  accompanied  by
appropriate  supporting  policies,  which  generated  the  new regime. The  very
use of  price  controls  undermined  the  credibility  in the  government's  resolve
in implementing  and sustaining  a fiscal  adjustment  and in  using  more
traditional  nominal  anchors,  such  as the  money  supply,  noniinal  bank  credit  or
the  exchange  rate.  In  addition,  anticipations  by  private  agents  of the  use
of controls  created  a perverse  mechanisti  that  exacerbated  the instability  of
inflation.
The  various  price  freezes  during  the  cycles  attempted  to stop inflation
by synchronizing  wages,  prices  and  the  exchange  rate,  thus  putting  an end  to
the  spiral. However,  time  and  again  were these  attempts  frustrated  by
inflationary  acceleration  which  got  out  of hand.  In the  post-HS  period  the
lack  of credibility  in stabilization  seems  to have  generated  expectations
that  accelerations  are  most likely  to  be stopped  by reimposition  of controls.
The  realization  that  this  would  be the  stabilization  strategy  induced  a
corresponding  behavior  pattern  on the  part  of the  private  sector.
Suppose  that  firms  know  that  once inflation  exceeds  a certain  level,
price  controls  (in  the  form  of a freeze)  are likely  to  be introduced,  but
there  is  uncertainty  regarding  the  rate  of inflaticn  that  would  trigger  their16
imposition.  Firms  will attempt  to enter  the  freeze  in  a favorable  position. 7
They  would  need to  balance  the  foregone  profits  they  could  incur  by setting
their  prices  'too  high'  against  the  potential  losses  resulting  from  setting
their  prices  "too  low." Once inflation  exceeds  a critical  level  the
probability  that  the  government  attempts  to stop  inflation  through  controls
increases, Firms  will then  increase  prices  further  in an  attempt  to
anticipate  the  government  action. If  monetary  and  exchange  rate  policies  are
basically  accommodating,  inflation  will thus  continue  to increase  and  firms
will raise  prices  further  resulting  in  an acceleration  of inflation  of the
type  observed  in  Argentina  and  Brazil  prior  to the  freeze.
IV.  Analysis  of the  Cycles
i.  Phases  of the  Cycles
There  are  typically  three  phases  in  the  cycles. The  first  phase
corresponds  to the imposition  of the  freeze  which  results  in a rapid
reduction  in inflation. In the  second  phase,  when  controls  are removed,
inflation  usually  accelerates  rapidly  in  this  period  and reaches  very  quickly
the  level  of inflation  prevailing  prior  to the  last  stabilization  effort.
After  the  initial  acceleration  there  is  usually  a short  period  in  which  there
is a  pause  in the  rate  of acceleration  of inflation,  only  to be followed  by a
drastic  explosion  in the  third  and  last  phase.
The  best  example  of these  phases  is  the  period  that  goes  from  the
7  Since  the  freeze  involves  a  maximum  price  each firm  has  an
incentive  to set  its  price  high to  gain  a safety  margin  and  then  provide  a
discount  if  necessary. This  margin  can  allow  for  increases  wages  that
might  take  place  during  the  price  freeze.17
Bresser plan to the Summer plan in Brazil (see figure l.b).  Inflation
accelerated very rapidly during the flexibilization stage between September
and December 1987, but there  was then a sharp drop in the rate of increase  of
inflation once it reached the 20 percent per month level.  Inflation then
crept up slowly for almost 8 months, but exploded towards the end of the
year.  A similar pattern is observed in Argentina between the Austral I; and
the Plan Primavera.
The Fall in Inflation
The price-wage-exchange rate freeze  was usually implemented  once
inflation was on an explosive hyperinflationary path (as argued by Canavese
and Di Tella (1988)).  Prior to the  Australs I and II, and the Plan Primavera
in Argentina, and the Cruzado, Bresser and Summer plans in Brazil
hyperinflation was all but unavoidable in the absence of a heterodox shx'.
In most cycles, the rapid acceleration of inflation immediately  preceding the
introduction of controls was largely induced by anticipations about the use
of controls. 8
Since controls had been anticipated it is not surprising that inflation
fell so quickly in all instances following the introduction  of controls, even
in cases in  which there was no adjustment in the fundamentals.9  Firms were
willing to abide by the freeze since their prices had already been increased
in anticipation of the freeze.  Figures 4.a and 4.b tend to support the view
8  The one exception is the BB plan in Argentina which addressed a
full blown hyperinflation.
9  In almost all cases controls did not result in widespread
shortages.  The Cruzado plan was the only exception in this respect  where
after a short span in which the above mentioned pattern occurred, a
generalized situation of excess demand led to the emergence of shortages
and black markets.18
that  the  freezes  were indeed  anticipated  by the  private  sector. Controls
were primarily  applied  mainly  in  the  industrial  sector,  usually  at the
wholesale level.  We can readily observe that in both countries the ratio of
industrial prices to consumer prices substantially increased prior to the
freezes.
Prior to the freeze there  had been a deterioration on the fiscal side
due to a loss in tax revenvies  resulting from the Olivera-Tanzi effect (see
figure 5.a), and a drastic deterioration in the prices of public sector
enterprises (see figure 6.a for  Argentina).  This fiscal deterioration was
partly offset by the reduction in real interest rates because nominal rates
did not catch up with the rapid increase in inflation.  On the other hand,
measures had been taken to improve external position prior to the program.
Holdi,'gs  of inte-national reserves and the trade balance were usually at a
relatively comfortable level, thus adding credibility to the ability of the
central bank to fix the exchange rate in the short run.
The short run sustainability  of the stabilization effort was made
possible by an initial, transitory, improvement in the fiscal accounts.  In
the recent heterodox programs, at least in  Argentina, the prices of public
sector enterprises were increased significantly  at the beginning of each
program, while tax revenues rose from the Olivera-Tanzi effect working in
reverse.  In addition, the acceleration of inflation preceding the
stabilization package had eroded the real value of internal debt.10 The only
problems on the fiscal side  were caused by the higher real interest rates
10  In most instances,  however, this gain  was transitory and domestic
debt increased rapidly during the freeze.  As opposed to other
hyperinflationary  outbursts,  domestic  debt  was not  fully  eroded  in  the
process.FIGURE 5
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usually  observed  at the  beginning  of each  stabilization  effort. However,
these  pressures  were r.ot  necessarily  inflationary  in  the  short  run  because  in
most cases  they  were financed  by issuing  domestic  interest  bearing  debt,  even
if the  strategy  was unsustainable  in the  medium  term.
Why  were the  freezes  introduced  at  higher  rates  of inflation  in  each
subsequent  cycle? This is  probably  related  to an increasing  reluctance  over
time  on the  part  of the  authorities  to  use  controls  as a stabilization
instrument.  Thus,  the  trigger  point  for  the  introduction  of controls  was
higher  after  each  failure. But  since  firms  thought  that  inflation  would  be
eventually  stopped  through  a new round  of controls,  rather  than  by orthodox
measures,  they  continued  to  engage  in anticipatory  pricing. In  the  end  the
authorities  gave  up and  controls  were imposed,  confirming  the  firms'
forecasts,  but  only  after  experiencing  a  higher  rate  of inflation.
The rise  in  Inflation  during  the  flexibilization  stage
While  it  was easy  to  bring  inflation  down  during  the  freeze,  it  was
difficult  to  maintain  it at this  low  level  for  a prolonged  period. A common
reason  for  flexibilization  were misalignments  in relative  prices  and  wages  in
most  cases  combined  with a deterioration  in the  fiscal  and  external  accounts,
high real  interest  rates,  a  build-up  of domestic  debt,  and  a large  premium
for  the  parallel  exchange  rate. The flexibilization  stage  generally  marked
the  beginning  of the intfationary  outbursts.
The  deterioration  of the  fiscal  accounts  over  time  was  primarily  due  to
the  transitory  nature  of the  initial  fiscal  adjustment.  On the  revenue  side,
there  was  a slow  but steady  erosion  in  real  prices  of public  sector
enterprises  (one  of the  key  anchors  of the  programs)  because  inflation  was20
not fully eliminated.11 On the expenditure side. the high real interest
rates  were the main problem, as they were rapidly leading to a build up of
domestic debt.  T:is issue was particularly acute in the Plan Primavera in
Argentina and the Summer plan in Brazil.
The increase in real interest rates and the related build up of
domestic debt during the period of the freeze  were critical factors in some
of the cycles for the abandonment of the freeze.  As can be seen from figures
7. and 8. a and b, there was a noticeable cyclical pattern, high real
interest rates and debt accumulation are characteristic of the early stage,
with the pattern reversed at the end of the cycle.  These cycles were marked
in Brazil while they  were milder in Argentina.  It can be seen that the
accelerations of inflation in Brazil prior to the Bresser and Summer plans
generated negative real interest rates thus eroding the build up of domestic
debt during the previous part of the cycle.  However, this was a temporary
phenomenon as the stock of debt increased rapidly during the first stage of
the HS programs, quickly exceeding previous stocks, and real interest rates
turned stronglv positive.  A similar story is observed in the  Argentine data.
The debt cycle is  more apparent for central bank debt, with a small build up
after the Austral II and a large one during the first phase of the Plan
Primavera.  One remarkable feature of these episodes is that neither in
11  It might be puzzling that even during the period of the freeze
inflation  was not fully eliminated.  There are two reasons for this.
First, due to the  way the in  which price indices are computed, current
inflation rates usually reflect past inflation  with one or two months lags.
Second, and probably more important, in most cases controls were not
applied as drastically as to avoid completely any increases in prices;
exceptions would be made if justified by increases in costs of imported
inputs or if prices were markedly out of line at the time of the freeze.
In addition, prices of agricultural products subject to seasonal
fluctuations  were by and large not subject to controls.20-a
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Argentina  or Brazil  hyperinflationary  outbursts  were effective  in  eroding  the
debt in  the  meditim  term.
The  initial  rise  in real  interest  rates  was endogenous  to  the
program. 12 They  were primarily  due  to lack  of credibility  on the
sustainability  of the  program. The  high  nominal  interest  rates  embodied  a
risk  premium  to  compensate  for  the  possible  collapse  of the  program. If the
program  succeeds  and  keeps  inflation  low  for  some  time  the  high  nominal  rates
wil!.  result  in  high real  ex-post  interest  rates,  although  real  rates  were  not
high  on a  ex-ante  basis. The  high real  interest  rates  complicated  the  fiscal
balance  in  Argentina  and  Brazil  (especially  in the  more recent  period)
because  they  occurred  in  association  with a  high level  of domestic  debt.
Flexibilization  was  many times  also  prompted  by difficulties  on the
external  side,  though  this  aspect  was  more  conspicuous  in  Argentina. The
maintenance  of the  fixed  exchange  rate  led  to  an appreciation  of the  real
exchange  rate,  although  in  most  cases  it  did  not reach  significant
proportions  because  controls  were also  maintained  on domestic  prices  and
wages.  Nevertheless,  as the  end  of the  freeze  was becoming  apparent  there
was typically  a large  deterioration  in the  reserve  position  of the  central
bank,  resulting  from  short  term  speculation  against  the  currency,  and  an
increase  in  the  premium  for  the  black  market  exchange  rate. In some
instances,  as in the  Plan  Primavera.  the  run  on central  bank reserves  was the
trigger  for  the  final  collapse  of the  program.
Importance  of the  Flexibilization  Stage
The  flexibilization  stage  is the  key  period  in  a heterodox  programs.
12  The reasons  for  the  high  ex-post  real  interest  rates  are  discussed
in the  existing  literature  (see  for  example  Dornbusch  (1986),  Dornbusch  and
Fischer  (1986)  and  Sachs  (1986)).22
Ideally,  the  fiscal  situation  should  remain  sound  during  this  stage  as prices
are liberalized  gradually  supported  by a strong  nominal  anchor,  either  the
exchange  rate  or  money.  The  lack  of fiscal  effort  in  both  countries  ruled
out the  possibility  of sustaining  low  inflation  as  prices  were liberalized.
But  it  was still  possible  that  inflation  stabilized  at a level  consistent
with the  fundamentals.  One  surprising  feature  in  both  countries  is  that
inflation  failed  to stabilize  on a  long  term  basis  once  controls  were
removed. While  some  initial  overshooting  of inflation  could  be a natural
response  to  price  liberalization,  a  well  planned  flexibilization  stage  should
have succeeded  in stabilizing  inflation,  perhaps  at  high rates. This
required,  in  addition  to the  maintenance  of the  fiscal  stance,  a clear  signal
regarding  the  choice  of  nominal  anchor  and  the  target  for  nominal  changes
(e.g.  the rate  of devaluation  or  monetary  growth). The  inability  to adWere
to  a nominal  anchor  during  the  flexibilization  stage  set  the  stage  for  the
hyperinflationary  outbursts  that  were to follow.
In  none  of the  efforts  in  Argentina  and  Brazil  there  was a clear
strategy  for  getting  out  of the  freeze. This  stage  was not  well planned,  and
in  mosc instances  it involved  the  simultaneous  abandonment  of all  the  nominal
ancho,rs.  This  problem  was apparent  in the  aftermath  of the  Cruzado  plan and
the  Plan  Primavera  where,  forced  by the  large  existing  imbalances,  all  the
nominal  anchors  (wages,  public  and  private  sector  prices,  and  the  exchange
rate)  were released  at  once,  with the  resulting  rapid  acceleration  in
inflation. But  this  pattern  was also  observed,  though  in  a milder  wav,
during  the flexibilization  phase  in  the  Bresser  and  Austral  II  plans.
Despite  the  lack  of strong  anchors,  there  was usually  a  pause  in the
increases  in inflation  once  it reached  the  previous  plateau. Inflation  then23
temporarily stabilized at that level (around  20 percent per month in Brazil
and 15 percent per month in Argentina) perhaps because there was a perception
that the economy could function  with a rate of inflation around that level
and hence that the government would not ta'e bold steps to fight it.  Since a
stabilization program based on controls  was not likely to be implemented
there was no reason to engage in anticipatory pricing.  However, rates of
inflation in this range can easily be destabilized by real or nominal shocks.
Since the inflation  process was basically asymmetric, the response to shocks
almost always involved an increase in inflation.  This increase very rapid'y
gained momentum as agents perceived that inflation  was once again on a clear
acceleration phase and that the imposition of controls became more likely.
At this stage the acceleration phase becomes almost unstoppable in the
absence of a stabilization shock.
ii. The Erosion of Credibility and Inflation Instability Over Time
The available evidence indicates that the  Austral and Cruzado plans,
the first of their type in each country, enjoyed more credibility than the
programs that followed them.  One reason for this difference is that these
two programs  were the first  major attempts for stopping inflation since the
beginning of the debt crisis.  Moreover, they were the first anti-inflation
efforts in  many years that succeeded in bringing down inflation in a
significant  way and to sustain it, even if this stability lasted for just a
few months.  The programs that followed the  Austral and Cruzado plans were
less comprehensive while it  was clearer that the use of controls was to
larger degree a substitute for the adjustment in the fundamentals.
The smaller amount of credibility enjoyed by each subsequent program
made the sustainability  of low inflation  during the period of controls more24
difficult and the explosions that followed  more dramatic.  The greater
credibility attached to the first program was partly due to the fact that
this were the first income policy based stabilization  attempts.  As the same
stabilization tactic  was used over and over, it became apparent that the
approach  would not succeed in maintaining low inflation for a long span, and
the private sector became better at anticipating public sector behavior.
The erosion of credibility over time was accompanied by a shorter
duration of low inflation at the beginning of each cycle and a stronger
explosion towards the end.  These events  were certainly not unrelated.  Since
the programs were less credible, it  was more difficult for the government to
maintain low inflation during the period of controls.  The combination of
events that made possible the  maintenance of low inflation in the initial
programs (such as relatively large seigniorage and low interest rates)  were
less favorable in the subsequent ones.
The difference in credibility experienced by the initial vis a vis the
follow up programs is apparent from the behavior of money demand during the
various stabilization attempts.  In figures 9.a and 9.b  we show the ratio of
Ml to M4 in Argentina and Brazil during the period.  This ratio increased
significantly in both countries during the Austral and Cruzado plans but did
not change in a major way after the implementation of the follow-up programs.
In Argentina we only observed a small short lived increase in this ratio
during the Austral II program, but no change in the downward sloping trend
during the Plan Primavera.  A more significant reversal is observed after the
BB plan in 1989, but the remonetization  did not come even close to the early
levels of the Austral plan.  Likewise in Brazil, this ratio only increased
slightly during the Bresser plan, but the increase  was relatively small and25
short  lived.
Similar  indications  are  obtained  from  estimations  of the  demand  for
money. 13 The  results  are shown  in table  4,14 Using  dummies  for  the  various
stabilization  attempts  we found  a clear  trend  in the  shifts  in the  demand  for
money.  In Brazil,  for  example,  there  was an upward  shift  in  money  demand
between  the  beginning  of the  Cruzado  plan  till  the  implementation  of the
Bresser  plan.  This shift  was reversed  in  the  period  from  the  Bresser  plan
onwards. Likewise,  the  dummies  for  Argentina  indicate  a positive  shift  in
the  demand  for  money  during  the  period  of the  Austral  plan (including  the
mild cycles),  followed  by a negative  shift  during  the  period  of the  strong
cycles.  Finally,  as  can  be seen  from  figures  10.a  and 10.b  which show  the
residuals  from  the  money  demand  equations,  our  equations  tend  to
13  The  estimations  were  done  using  the  Cagan  demand  for  money
function  using  monthly  data  for  Argentina  and  Brazil. The  estimation
period  for  Argentina  goes  from  1982.12  to 1989.04  and  for  Brazil  from
1980.01  to  1989.06. Separate  estimations  were  done  for  the  whole  sample
and for  the  period  before  and  after  the  HSs. We also  used  dummy  variables
to find  out  whether  there  were shifts  in the  demand  for  money  in  the
period.
14  The  estimation  was  done  using  OLS.  The results  reported  in  this
regression  use  current  inflation  as a proxy  for  the  expected  rate  of
inflation  in the  period. The  results  of these  regressions  were  basically
similar  when  we used  a  weighted  average  of past  inflations  and  even  future
inflation  as a proxy  for  the  expected  return  on domestic  money.26
TABLE 4
(monthly  data)
log (Ml)  - a +  b (INF)
ARGENTINA
Adjusted R
Period  a  b  Dl  D3  D4  Squared  D.W.
1982.12-1989.04  -3.4  -0.023  0.081  -0.15  -0.26  0.73  0.46
(-66.4)  (-8.3)  (1.6)  (-3.2)  (-4.8)  (52.0)
Dl - 1 for 85.07-87.03
D2 - 1 for 87.11-88.09
D3 - 1 for 88.09-89.04
BRAZIL
Adjusted R
Period  a  b  Dl  D2  D3  Squared  D.W.
1980.01-1989.06  -0.28  -0.026  0.59  -0.04  0.64  0.36
(-7.2)  (-7.2)  (9.5)  (-0.6)  (67.3)
Dl - 1 for 86.03-87.06
D2 - 1 for 87.07-88.06
D3 - 1 for 86.03-89.0627
underestimate money demand during the Austral I and Cruzado plans, but they
overestimated for the Austral II, Primavera, Bresser and Summer plans.15
iii.  Macro Performance in the Cycle Regime
One striking feature of the macroeconomic performance during the period
of the cycles is that despite the large fluctuations in nominal variables,
average inflation did not increase significantly in this period.  The data in
tables 5.a and 5.b shce'  that in  Argentina for the period 1986-88 inflation,
budget de.icits and seigniorage  were on average lower than in the pre-
Austral period, while growth and the externa. performance remained at similar
levels.  In part this is explained because inflation in  Argentina was already
very high prior to the Austral plan, and the performance during that period
had been affected by the high, unstable inflation rates prevailing at the
time.  Nevertheless, a similar pattern is observed in Brazil where there was
no indication of any significant  deterioration in macro-indicators during the
period of the cycles.  True, inflation on average almost doubled in the post-
Cruzado period, however, increases of this size  were not unusual in Brazil,
and already happened in 1975, 1980 and 1983.
Neither did the increased  variability in  nominal variables result in
larger variability in real variables.  Table 5.c shows the mean and standard
deviation of inflation, interest rates, some key relative prices, real taxes
15  The behavior of other financial indicators  also points to a
difference in perception between the first HSs and the follow-ups.
Particularly impressive  were the size and relatively long duration of the
stock market booms that started almost immediately  after the launching of
the Austral and Cruzado plans.  The evolution of the premium on foreign
exchange was also different in the first two programs although the pattern
was clearer in Argentina.  The premium fell on impact  much more in the
initial programs than in the follow-ups  while the duration of .he low
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and  indices  of real  activity. If  we  exclude  the  hyperinflation  period  in
Argentina,  the  data indicates  that  the  greater  variability  of irflation  in
the  post-HS  periods  did  not lead  to larger  variations  in  relative  prices.
production,  and in  Ar,entina,  not  even  on  nominal  interest  rates. Quite
surprisingly,  in  both  countries  the  real  exchange  rate  was  more stable,  in
the  post-HS  period.
Although  performance  was  on average  similar  in  both  periods,  there  was
* continuous  deterioration  in  the  overall  situation  in  the  post-HS  period
over  time. For  example,  while  growth  in  Argentina  did  not change  on average
very  much  before  and  after  the  HS, there  has  been  a downward  trend  over the
more recent  period. Likewise,  inflation  has  been rising  in  both  countries
over  time. More dramatic  results  are  obtained  if  one includes  the recent
Argentinean  hyperinflation  in  the  analysis. Growth,  which  was slightly
negative  in 1988,  became  more  so in 1989,  and  the  increase  in inflation  was
acconmpanied  by increased  variability  in real  variables.
V.  InDlications  of this  Regime  and  Puzzles
The relatively  short  experience  with  the  inflation-stabilization  cycles
analyzed  in  the  previous  sections  does  not  allow  a thorough  evaluation  of the
regime. We can  nevertheless  draw  some  preliminary  implications  regarding  the
nature  of the inflation  process  during  the  period,  likely  developments  in the
absence  of a change  in regime,  and  what features  of the  existing  regime  are
relevant  for  the  design  and  implementation  of a saccessful  stabilization
program.
Is hy2erinflation  avoidable729
It is difficult to anticipate, however, whether the system could
continue functioning in this  manner without facing hyperinflation.  The
average rate of in.lation has been constantly increasing over time in both
countries.  In addition, the cycles have tended to become shorter and
inflation peaked at new, higher levels in each new round.  All the evidence
indicates that it is difficult to avoid hyperinflation  while the economy
remains in this regime.  Argentina faced a full  blown hyperinflation after
the collapse of the Plan Primavera, and another in the aftermath of the BB
plan, now Brazil is gcing in the same direction.
The Argentine hyperinflation did not follow the pattern observed in
other experiences of this type.  There seems to be a consensus that the
drastic acceleration that started - February 1989 was triggered by a run out
of domestic money.  This run was driven by the interaction  of two faLtors:
first, there was an unsustainable build up of domestic public debt, resulting
from very high interest rates to support the exchange rate, that raised fears
that a maxi-devaluation was in the making; and second, the increasing
likelihood that the Peronist party would be elected in May and that they
would follow populist policies, including a further increase in the budget
deficit.
Under other circumstances, the run out of domestic currency would have
led to a depreciation of the domestic currency, but not necessarily to an
acceleration in inflation of the type observed at that time.  The main reason
why the run led to hyperinflation was that it took place in an already
unstable environment,  with very weak nominal anchors.  It is difficult to
rule out the possibility that if the economy had continued under this regime
for a long enough period hyperinflation  would have developed anyway.  In30
fact,  this is  the  way things  are  developing  in  Brazil  where  inflation  is
relentlessly  increasing  (it  exceeded  the  'Cagan's  critical'  50  percent  level
in  January)  and  hyperinflation  appears  to  be all  but  unavoidable.
The  Alternative  Scenarios  to  Price  Controls
The  failure  of  Austral  and  Cruzado  programs  set  the  stage  for  the
cycles  that  were to follow. As we already  mentioned,  the  main destabilizing
factor  in  Argentina  and  Brazil  was the  repeated  use  of price  controls. Was
there  any  other  feasible  way of dealing  with inflation  in  the  initial  and .n
the  follow  up programs?
One  option  would  have  been  to follow  the  same  fiscal  stance  adopted  in
the  various  programs,  but to refrain  from  using  price  and  wage  controls  or
price  guidelines.  In Brazil  this  may  have  prevented  the  increased
instal.'lity  which  we witnessed  after  the  Cruzado  plan. However,  this  does
not  mean that  the  upward  trend  in inflation  could  have  been  prevented. It is
unrealistic  to assume  that  inflation  can  be stabilized  in the  long  run  at  an
annual  rate  of 200Z  as claimed  many times  by the  authorities. If inflation
persists  at this  rate  the  government  loses  credibility  in its  ability  to
reduce  in,lation  and  reactions  to inflationary  shocks  become  asymmetrical
leading  eventually  to change  only in  the  upward  direction.
In  Argentina,  one  plausible  option  would  have  been to  apply  a one  time
heterodox  shock  (of  the  type  used in  the  Austral  I)  but to refrain  from
applying  price  controls,  in the  subsequent  stabilizations.  With  the
reduction  in the  fiscal  deficit  to  a level  financeable  by the  inflation  tax
it  might  have  been  possible  to  have  a  much  more stable  development  than  the
actual  one.
A  different  option  would  have  been  to announce  a target  for  the  nominal31
anchors  and  maintain  them  at a level  consistent  with the  reduced  fiscal
deficit. We know  from  recent  developments  in  policy  game  theory  that if  the
government  can  establish  greater  credibility  in  its  monetary  (or  exchange
rate)  policy  rules  then  inflation  will  come  down  even  in the  same  fiscal
setting. Thus  the 'monetary  arithmetic"  of Sargent  and  Wallace  is  not
applicable  when credibility  issues  are involved.
It is  difficult  to  evaluate  at  present  the  July 1989  stabilization
program  in  Argentina  in terms  of a  possible  changes  of regime. Although  the.
program  contained  freezes  of the  exchange  rate  and  public  sector  prices,  as
in  the  previous  cycles,  the  official  freeze  was  not  extended  to  wages  and
prices  in the  private  sector. In  addition,  the  program  had  the *benefit'  of
taking  place  in  the  wake  of a  hyper-inflationary  experience  in  the  second
quarter  of 1989  which  may  have  created  a  more favorable  setting  for  breaking
with the  past.  Finally,  a fiscal  reform  (at,d  more  announcements  about
privat:zations)  were  done  on top  of the  benefits  from  the  Tanzi-Olivera
effect  (in  reverse). Nevertheless,  last  December  inflation  exploded  once
again  driven  by a  depreciation  of the  free  market  exchange  rate,  thus
reinforcing  the  perception  that  the  latest  stabilization  efforts  were  not
strong  enough  to  break  with the  old regime.
We mentioned  already  that  tight  monetary  policies  were put  into  effect
in  Argentina  towards  that  end  of 1986,  1987  and  1988  and in  the  Summer  Plan
of 1988-89  in Brazil. However,  the  governments  were unwilling  to  persist
with these  policies  in  view  of sharp  increases  in real  interest  rates.
Consequently  these  policies  were  abandoned  and  eventually  a  new round  of
income  policies  was put into  effect. Therefore,  the  tightening  of monetary
rules  seems  to  have  been  an  option  for  which  the  authorities  were  not ready.32
Until  there  is sufficient  resolve  to  deal  with inflation  (and  pay  the  cost  of
disinflation)  there  is  no  way in  which  the inflationary  trend  could  be
reversed  in  each  of these  countries. However,  much of the  excessive
instability  could  have  been  prevented  by  avoiding  the  repeated  use  of income
policies.
Implications  for  a Successful  Stabilization  Program
What are  the  implications  of the  cycles  regime  for  future  stabilization
programs  in  Argentina  and  Brazil? One  of the  main  problems  which  will
confront  any  stabilization  in these  countries  is  the  establishment  of a
minimum  degree  of credibility  in  government's  disinflationary  policies.
In the  fiscal  area it  will  be necessary  to  establish  credibility  in  the
sustainability  of the fiscal  adjustment,  a property  which  was lacking  not
only in  the  Austral  Plan,  but  also  in  all  the  stabilization  programs  over  the
past  30 years  in  Argentina. Presumably  this  will require  the  implementation
of basic  fiscal  reforms  with the  aim  of convincing  the  public  of the
sustainability  the  adjustments.  The  mere reliance  on the  Olivera-Tanzi
effect  (in  reverse),  high  public  sector  prices  and  a fall  in real  wages
during  the  freeze  will not  will  no suffice,  because  these  measures  are  not
immune  to inflationary  shocks.
In addition,  it is  necessary  to restore  the  credibility  in  the
governments'  commitment  to stand  behind  the  nominal  anchors  in  spite  of the
costs  that  this  may entail. This is  a  different  dimension  of the  credibility
issue  which is  not  identical  with the  fiscal  aspect. This  aspect  is
important  because  it is  well  known  that  governments  can  use  inflation  (or
devaluation)  to  achieve  non-fiscal  objectives  such  as a reduction  in the  real
wage or a real  depreciaition.  Since  inflation  has  been  used  to fulfill  these33
functions in the past (especially  in Brazil to erode the real  wage), the
fiscal adjustment  will not be enough to overcome these difficulties.  The
critical aspect here is  whether the government will be willing to maintatin
the announced exchange rate  or monetary targets if faced  with overvaluation
or high real interest rates due to adverse expectations.  Given the recurrent
failures during the cycles period there is  no possibility in the present
situation of avoiding the confrontation between pessimistic expectations and
the effort to set  nominal anchors.  This confrontation  will result in a
monetary crunch or in overvaluation of the currency depending on whether the
money supply or the exchange rate is  used as anchor.  in each case the growth
of the economy will have to be cut down in the short  or intermediate run.
The foregoing remarks imply that stabilization  programs should undergo
a shift of orientation in the orthodox direction.  Further use of price
controls should be avoided in order to restore credibility in conventional
anchors.  There are of course well known arguments for government
intervention in nominal contracts in labor and capital markets in order to
alleviate the surprise effect of stabilization.  In practice, this took the
form of constructing 'conversion  tables" for loans contracted before the
stabilization and of temporary suspension of lagged wage indexation  combined
with a realignment of the base wage.  It  was especially the latter element
which entailed the introduction  of price controls as an insurence against
erosion of the real  wage.  However, since it is essential at the present
stage to redress the erosion of credibility in both countries as a result of
the use of controls, the imposition of a wage-price freeze in the private
sector should be avoided.34
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